A Theoretical Examination of Practical Game Playing: Lookahead Search

Abstract. Lookahead search is perhaps the most natural and widely used game playing strategy. Given the practical importance of the method, the aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical performance examination of lookahead search in a wide variety of applications. To determine a strategy play using lookahead search, each agent predicts multiple levels of possible re-actions to her move (via the use of a search tree), and then chooses the play that optimizes her future payoff accounting for these re-actions. There are several choices of optimization function the agents can choose, where the most appropriate choice of function will depend on the specifics of the actual game- we illustrate this in our examples. Furthermore, the type of search tree chosen by computationally-constrained agent can vary. We focus on the case where agents can evaluate only a bounded number, k, of moves into the future. That is, we use depth k search trees and call this approach k-lookahead search. We apply our method in five well-known settings: industrial organization (Cournot’s model); AdWord auctions; congestion games; valid-utility games and basic-utility games; cost-sharing network design games. We consider two questions. First, what i

The Facility Location Problem with General Cost Functions

In this paper we introduce a generalized version of the facility location problem in which the facility cost is a function of the number of clients assigned to the facility. We focus on the case of concave facility cost functions. We observe that this problem can be reduced to the uncapacitated facility location problem. We analyze a natural greedy algorithm for this problem and show that its approximation factor is at most 1.861. We also consider several generalizations and variants of this problem

Convergence and approximation in potential games

We study the speed of convergence to approximately optimal states in two classes of potential games. We provide bounds in terms of the number of rounds, where a round consists of a sequence of movements, with each player appearing at least once in each round. We model the sequential interaction between players by a best-response walk in the state graph, where every transition in the walk corresponds to a best response of a player. Our goal is to bound the social value of the states at the end of such walks. In this paper, we focus on two classes of potential games: selfish routing games, and cut games (or party affiliation games [7]). © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

On the Simultaneous Edge-Coloring Conjecture

At the 16th British Combinatorial Conference (1997), Cameron introduced a new concept called 2-simultaneous edge-coloring and conjectured that every bipartite graphic sequence, with all degrees at least 2, has a 2-simultaneous edge-colorable realization. In fact, this conjecture is a reformulation of a conjecture of Keedwell (Graph Theory, Combinatorics, Algorithms and Applications, Proceedings of Third China--USA International Conference, Beijing, June 1--5, 1993, World Scientific Publ. Co., Singapore, 1994, pp. 111--124) on the existence of critical partial latin squares (CPLS) of a given type. In this paper, using some classical results about nowhere-zero 4-flows and oriented cycle double covers, we prove that this conjecture is true for all bipartite graphic sequences with all degrees at least 4

A Unifying Tool for Bounding the Quality of Non-cooperative Solutions in Weighted Congestion Games

We present a general technique, based on a primal-dual formulation, for analyzing the quality of self-emerging solutions in weighted congestion games. With respect to traditional combinatorial approaches, the primal-dual schema has at least three advantages: first, it provides an analytic tool which can always be used to prove tight upper bounds for all the cases in which we are able to characterize exactly the polyhedron of the solutions under analysis; secondly, in each such a case the complementary slackness conditions give us an hint on how to construct matching lower bounding instances; thirdly, proofs become simpler and easy to check. For the sake of exposition, we first apply our technique to the problems of bounding the prices of anarchy and stability of exact and approximate pure Nash equilibria, as well as the approximation ratio of the solutions achieved after a one-round walk starting from the empty strategy profile, in the case of affine latency functions and we show how all the known upper bounds for these measures (and some of their generalizations) can be easily reobtained under a unified approach. Then, we use the technique to attack the more challenging setting of polynomial latency functions. In particular, we obtain the first known upper bounds on the price of stability of pure Nash equilibria and on the approximation ratio of the solutions achieved after a one-round walk starting from the empty strategy profile for unweighted players in the cases of quadratic and cubic latency functions. We believe that our technique, thanks to its versatility, may prove to be a powerful tool also in several other applications